During the last decade, corporate governance has become a contested and controversial issue. The rules for governing public corporations are being challenged by a diverse group of critics ranging from institutional investors to labor unions and social activists. Some hope to give greater weight in corporate decision-making to shareholders; others hope to bolster the influence of other stakeholders such as employees and customers. Less organized but nevertheless influential are the professional managers who make most of the strategic and operating decisions for the corporation.
Since the early twentieth century, corporations have come under the control of these professional managers.
1 Yet managers typically own only a relatively small portion of the assets they manage. These facts give rise to two key issues in corporate governance: first, how to make managers accountable to those who have made investments in the corporation, and second, what constitutes an "investment" in the corporation that warrants the right to monitor and direct management..
There is stunning international variety in the rules by which these issues are resolved; no two countries handle corporate governance in precisely the same way. These differences-and the international debate that swirls around them-have recently attracted an outpouring of scholarly research on the characteristics and consequences of various corporate governance systems.
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Despite a welter of differences, it's possible to identify two distinctive patterns among the advanced industrial countries. 3 First there is the "shareholder" system, which also goes by such names as the Anglo-American system, the market-outsider system, or simply stock-market capitalism. The other is the "stakeholder" system, which has also been called the relational-insider system, the dedicated-capital system, and welfare capitalism. This is the model that prevails in Germany, Japan and some other countries. 4 The former may be thought of as an "exit" model, where shareholders sell shares to management's job is to mediate between shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders such as business groups members and suppliers. 8 In short, there is considerable cross-national diversity in corporate governance and the impact that employees have on it. But how is that national systems achieved such diversity in the first place? And what are the prospects for convergence in corporate governance systems? These questions are considered in this essay.
Pundits of globalization predict the eventual demise of the relational governance model and its replacement by the Anglo-American model. Were this to occur, it would sharply change the relationship of employees to their employer in many parts of the world. Yet it's not obvious that convergence is inevitable. As I will show, there is considerable inertia and persistence of national governance models. And while one can find evidence of institutional diffusion across borders, it occurs in multiple directions; not all roads lead to Wall Street.
I. Origins of National Diversity
An essay of this brevity cannot do justice to the vast literature on comparative corporate governance. Suffice it to say that the usual explanations of national diversity in economic institutions-law, politics, culture, and resource endowments-also come into play in the area of corporate governance.
a. Law
Legal explanations for corporate governance patterns start with the observation that the "typical" U.S. pattern of a corporation being owned by a multitude of investors is actually rather atypical among advanced economies. 9 The pattern is limited to common law countries. The association between dispersed ownership and the common law has been attributed to the British courts' shift of allegiance from the Crown to Parliament and property owners. The courts eventually came to protect investors not only against 8 Keisuke Nakamura and Michio Nitta, "Developments in Industrial Relations and Human Resource Practices in Japan" in Richard A. Locke et al., eds., Employment Relations in a Changing World (1994), 347-50; Jacoby, supra note 4, at 462-3; Masahiko Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy (1988) . A recent survey found strong support among Japanese managers for the notion that a corporation has multiple stakeholders including employees, and little support for the idea that corporations are the property of their shareholders and employees merely a factor of production. Takeshi Inagami and RIALS, eds., Gendai Nihon-no Koporeto Gabanansu (Corporate Governance in Contemporary Japan), either as an expression of cronyism or as a form of monitoring to prevent abuses that in common law countries are subject to legal enforcement.
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There are, however, problems with the argument that civil law countries offer less protection to small investors and that they lack extensive equity markets.. First, it doesn't well apply to Japan, a country influenced by German legal traditions. Despite corporate cross-shareholdings and bloc ownership, Japan nevertheless has a huge and liquid market for corporate equities. It also does not appear to be true that common law countries consistently do a better job of protecting small investors. Another way of classifying corporate governance systems is to distinguish between those with bank ownership and involvement, as in Germany and Japan, and those where banks play a relatively small role, as in the United States and Britain. To account for this difference, scholars like Mark Roe have emphasized the importance of political traditions. In the U.S., populist suspicion of concentrated financial power (and other large institutions) led to statutory restrictions on the creation of nationwide banks and, later on, to the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of commercial and investment banking. Hence U.S. banks never became as large as their foreign counterparts, as able to invest in equities, or as motivated to monitor corporate managers.
12 Now the shoe is on the other foot: there is an implicit presumption that politics may have interfered with the development of an "efficient" governance system in the United States, whereas in the legal explanations favored by neoclassical economists the presumption is that commonlaw countries have governance systems that are more efficient and conducive to economic growth.
How, then, did Europe and Japan come to include not only banks but other "stakeholders," including employees, in their corporate governance systems? On this question, a more general argument has been made about societal differences in the sequencing of key historical events. Simply put, the U.S. was a country in which big business emerged before big government, whereas the order was reversed in Europe and Japan. Prior to the New Deal, the U.S. had the weakest national government in the developed world, giving business a monopoly on political and institutional power.
Attempts to regulate the economy or to harness business in the furtherance of public objectives were strongly resisted by businessmen, up to and including the New Deal era, when the federal government vastly expanded its regulatory efforts and sought to compel the involvement of employees in corporate governance through collective bargaining 13 .
In other industrialized countries, strong, centralized governments existed before The other country that doesn't fit the attribution of European governance structures to a social democratic ethos is Japan. Although not a social democracy, Japan's approach to corporate governance has strong similarities to the stakeholder system of continental Europe. In Japan there is concentrated ownership by banks and other companies; a preference for voice over exit; and expectations (albeit not regulations) that a company should be responsible to employees and suppliers as well as shareholders. What's important to note is that these practices are not legally required yet are regularly complied with. Perhaps a key factor here is not social democracy so much as the "all in one boat" mentality that prevailed in postwar Japan and Europe as ethnically homogeneous societies with a discredited business class and restive labor movements sought to rebuild their economies along new and more cooperative lines. Moreover, in
Japan the Occupation created a postwar legal muddle, which led to various private rules regarding shareholder rights, takeovers, and banks; this is consistent with a line of legal scholarship that views norms as low-cost substitutes for public rules. During the 1990s, as the U.S. stock market boomed and financial markets globalized, there were signs that the "relational" governance systems of continental Europe and Japan were becoming more like the Anglo-American "shareholder" system.
Seeking to take advantage of the prestige and the funds associated with U.S. equity markets, a growing number of foreign firms sought listings on the U.S. exchanges. To meet exchange requirements, the firms had to adopt U.S. standards such as having at least two outside directors and providing equal opportunity for all shareholders to participate in tender offers. 25 At the same time, U.S. investors have sought stronger protection for their ever-larger holdings in overseas corporations while U.S. financial companies are trying to build U.S.-style equity markets and an "equity culture" outside the United States.
Another force for convergencehas been economic stagnation in Europe and Japan, especially as contrated to strong U.S. economic growth. This has led policymakers in all three countries to conclude that disparities in growth rates are due, in part, to corporate governance factors, and that the remedy is to emulate the U.S. system. Hastening this conclusion has been the spread of neoliberal ideologies that question the current validity of the social compromises and "social market" systems forged at the end of the Second World War. The combined result has been a variety of statutory changes seeking to remold "relational" governance systems more along Anglo-American lines. In Germany, there is currently a proposal to permit negotiated changes in the co-determination system. 26 In Japan, the 1990s saw passage of a plethora of governance-related laws, such as those permitting shareholder class-action suits and stock repurchases by corporations, as well as laws that hastened restructuring by reducing the number of board meetings required to approve mergers and by permitting equity swaps in mergers. Financial deregulation and the growth of foreign ownership are forcing Japanese managers to pay technological lock-in, such as gas-powered automobiles or the Microsoft operating system. 47 Path dependence has been applied to less tangible innovations. For example, concentrated share ownership in Germany has been attributed to events that occurred long ago, such as the bank-based system of corporate finance. Given the environment that prevailed at that time, bank-based financing and ownership made sense. 48 Then it was followed by a series of adaptive innovations-bank-issued securities held in depositary accounts, bank technical departments for monitoring corporations, corporate reputations based on relations with a main bank--that had the effect of making a switch to more dispersed ownership so costly that parties could not change even if they had reason to do so. Also inhibiting switching was the growth of supportive practices, both regulatory and normative (e.g., anti-takeover norms and professional accounting and legal norms regarding bloc holding). Finally there were economies of scale analogous to network externalities: the greater the number of firms with concentrated ownership, the cheaper this method of financing and governance. 49 Complementarities extend to labor markets and labor relations. In Germany and Japan, enterprise unions and co-determination are a good fit with a stakeholder approach to governance that does not privilege shareholders. Moreover, a corporation's long-term relations with banks, customers, and suppliers facilitate commitments to "permanent"
employees. 50 In turn, these commitments promote extensive firm-specific training systems because employees require assurances that the returns on their training investments will be fairly divided and ultimately paid. Treating employees as stakeholders-through participation, representation, and stable employment-provides such assurances. In the United States, by contrast, employer training investments are much lower than in Germany or Japan, employees are more mobile (especially engineers), and there are few examples of employees having a role in corporate governance except in unionized firms.
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Or take managerial labor markets. In the U.S., executive compensation based on stock options is, at least in theory, supposed to alleviate the agency problem associated with dispersed ownership. Also, fluid managerial labor markets facilitate contests for control by making it easier for ousted managements to find new jobs after a hostile takeover. In Japan, the contest for control occurs not through hostile bids and replacement of ostensibly ineffectual managers but through career employment and the managerial promotion system. Because managers spend their entire career with a single firm, and because they are carefully evaluated through a kind of tournament system, the winners -who become company directors--are usually the most dedicated and competent executives at the firm. They are also well known and trusted by the various long-term stakeholders at the company, including banks, customers, suppliers, and employees. These outstanding managers are rewarded with a seat on the company board, although to protect against entrenchment, there is a maximum limit on board tenure and mediocre senior managers serve shorter board terms.
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As these examples suggest, it's difficult to disentangle the exogenous initial conditions that established a path from the ex post adaptations. The common law legal tradition was exogenous for the United States, whereas for Meiji Japan, legal and other social systems were a matter of choice. 53 Strong craft traditions were exogenous in Germany and caused employers to put a premium on training and participation, whereas One thing is clear, however: Given institutional complementarities and path dependence, it's difficult for one country to borrow a particular practice and expect it to perform similarly when transplanted to a different context. Two examples: First, despite numerous calls for the Japanese to do more in the way of venture capital, the fact is that Japan lacks the fluid labor markets, legal expertise, and equity-related compensation schemes that are the underpinnings of the U.S. venture-capital approach. The Japanese nevertheless do have high rates of innovation, but they achieve it via corporate spin-offs and big-company funding rather than venture capital. 55 Second, were the Japanese or
Germans to adopt a U.S.-style corporate governance approach that relies on takeovers to mitigate agency problems, it would prove highly disruptive of managerial incentive and selection systems presently in place. 56 Hostile takeovers also would be disruptive of relations with suppliers and key customers, a substantial portion of which exist on a longterm basis. In Germany and, especially, in Japan, there is less vertical integration of industrial companies than in the United States or the United Kingdom. Rather than rely primarily on arms-length contracts to protect suppliers and purchasers from opportunism, there is heavy use of relational contracting based on personal ties, trust, and reputation.
Personal ties are supported by lifetime employment; the business relations are buttressed by cross-share holding. 57 In short, imitation across path-dependent systems is inhibited by the cost of having to change a host of complementary practices that make an institution effective in a particular national system. 1996) , 227-52. High stock turnover creates greater volatility and uncertainty in equity prices than exist under a system of more patient capital. If this is the case, and if uncertainty works against long-term projects, then it's possible that there exists a capital-market bias against longterm investments that would be heightened by the sensitivity of equity prices to near-term information. In fact, the evidence is ambiguous-much of it based on R&D figures that are not a reliable measure of "long term"--and one can find empirical support on both sides of the issue. performance. 62 In Japan, main banks play an additional role in preventing the premature liquidation of temporarily depressed, but still productive, firms, 63 while in Germany, bank ownership is associated with higher returns on capital. 64 Moreover, the existence of multiple blockholders and the presence of an employee voice in corporate governance help to attenuate private rent-seeking by managers or particular blockholders.
Evidence of the agency problem under dispersed ownership can be inferred from the run-up during the 1990s in salaries and options received by U.S. executives, the costs of which are only now beginning to be realized as stockmarkets cool off. 65 German and Japanese executives can only look wistfully at these compensation levels and, perhaps, write op-ed pieces urging reform of the governance systems that restrain their own pay. A more precise measure of how different governance systems handle managerial ineptitude is to examine the likelihood that chief executives will be replaced when corporate performance-earnings or share price-declines. Here, there is no difference in replacement sensitivity between Germany, Japan, and the U.S, which suggests that the three systems produce similar results despite vastly different processes for reaching them. 66 In theory, giving employees a voice in governance-either at the workplace or corporate levels--should enhance their willingness to invest in firm-specific skills and to share productivity-enhancing ideas with the employer, thereby mitigating bilateral monopoly "hold ups." Voice should also reduce turnover and turnover-related costs. 67 and bias employment decisions in favor of senior employees. 68 Empirically, employee voice is found to have mixed and ambiguous effects on corporate performance, whether it occurs via statute, as in Germany, via custom, as in Japan, or via employee choice, as in the United States. 69 It matters what size is the organization and at which level employee voice is exercised, with more positive effects found in smaller organizations and at the workplace level (e.g., employee participation, works councils) than in larger organizations and at the strategic level (e.g., board representation). This is hardly surprising, given that employee voice usually is stronger in smaller, localized units. 70 Yet there is a great deal that is unknown about these issues or that we are just beginning to learn about, such as the ability of employee monitoring to deter managerial misfeasance.
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Given the diverse costs and benefits associated with different governance systems, and given bounded rationality --the near-impossibility of measuring and toting them up--it makes no sense to proclaim either relational or shareholder capitalism is microeconomically superior to the other. In light of these ambiguities, it's not surprising that the tendency toward global convergence has been rather weak. Inertia is consistent with the hypothesis that European and Japanese actors understand that switching costs are high and the likelihood of gain uncertain.
c. Macroeconomic Issues and Outcomes
While the microeconomic evidence is ambiguous, the macroeconomic evidence, at least recently, implies the superiority of shareholder governance. The strong U.S.
with this line of reasoning: if the links between corporate governance and microeconomic performance are ambiguous, they are even less clear at the macroeconomic level, where the number of causal variables affecting performance is much greater. Hence the presumption that variations in corporate governance can explain variations in macroeconomic performance is heroic, to say the least.
The one study to examine this question found no relationship between the dispersion of share ownership-the sine qua non of shareholder governance--and per capita GDP levels. 72 In the United States, the association between changes in corporate governance and changes in macroeconomic performance is similarly difficult to discern.
If anything, there is a rough temporal correlation between heavy M&A activity and poor performance (in the 1980s and early 1990s), and declining M&A activity and improved economic performance (in the latter 1990s).
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If it were the case that recent U.S. prosperity was due largely to its corporate governance system, one would expect that countries with similar systems should have enjoyed similar prosperity, or at least more of it than those adhering to the stakeholder model. But this is hardly the case. British growth rates lagged behind Japan's in the 1970s and 1980s and lagged behind Germany's in the 1990s. As for British per capita GDP, it remained well below Japanese and German levels through the 1990s. While
London today is relatively prosperous, the rest of the country is not. 74 Northern England has a per capita GDP that is 60 percent of London levels, which is why Great Britain is the largest beneficiary of EU structural development funds after Greece, Portugal, and rural Spain. 75 Canada, another adherent of the shareholder model, has per capita income levels that exceed Britain's, but the country has been experiencing economic stagnation throughout the 1990s. 76 To put the shoe on the other foot, it's unlikely that corporate governance was a major factor-if it was a factor at all-behind the sluggish growth rates observed in the emphasis on specific human capital in German and Japan is supportive of productionbased technological learning, incremental innovation, and high quality production, all areas in which those economies have specialized. By contrast, the U.S. emphasis on resource mobility and on high short-term rewards directs resources to big-bang technological breakthroughs. In short, there are substantial gains to be reaped from sustaining institutional diversity and competing internationally on that basis. Much of the discussion about corporate governance is framed in efficiency terms, as if one could measure national institutions in a comparative statics framework. Yet this framework is inadequate for understanding the dynamic properties of governance systems, especially those related to innovation and long-term growth. 84 Moreover, when there are multiple equilibria and bounded rationality regarding what constitutes an institutional optimum, we are operating in the world of the second best. 85 In that world, there is no reason to believe that revamping a governance system will necessarily move an economy closer to an economic optimum. The economic case for the superiority of Anglo-American governance -and of the Anglo-American version of "free markets" as we know them, as opposed to a theoretical ideal-is actually rather weak. 86 Another problem with the static approach to corporate governance is that it gives short shrift to normative issues, which bulk large when we consider the role that source of capital to the enterprise. 87 And, while shareholders are protected through limited liability and portfolio diversification, employees have neither of these riskreducing shields. So a normative case can be made that shareholders are getting more than their due and employees less. This is not to say that we lack economic rationales for involving employees in corporate governance. As we have seen, many types of employee voice are associated with better firm performance, which is hardly surprising given that employees possess inside information about inefficient processes and ineffectual managers, and are at least as motivated as shareholders to see that the firm is run effectively. 88 Moreover, voice creates habits of responsibility that buttress citizenship and other civic values associated with economic growth. 89 Voice and civic values are associated with equity in the distribution of economic rewards, and equity, in turn, is associated with higher long-term growth rates. 90 Today, European and Japanese systems of corporate governance are under attack for their failure to conform to Anglo-American practices. The strongest criticism comes from financial corporations eager to propagate an equity culture and associated commissions. There is also a conservative political critique rooted in the belief that unemployment is due to corporations giving excessive weight to employee interests.
At this time it does not appear likely that faddish predictions of convergence will come true. The notion that relational forms of governance will give way to shareholder
capitalism is yet another case of wishful thinking. On the other hand, it's also unlikely that the Anglo-American system will move very far in the direction of stakeholder capitalism. The same forces that hold other systems in check-path dependence, institutional complementarities, and wariness about costs and benefits-will likely keep U.S. workers in the position of being among the least influential group of employees in the advanced industrial world.
Lest this sound excessively deterministic and pessimistic, keep in mind that path dependence is not an iron law of evolution. There are moments when sudden shifts can and do occur, causing the "punctuation" of equilibria and movement onto a new evolutionary path. It is not well understood what triggers these changes. 91 So, like
